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ABSTRACT
Several authors have made claims, none of which has been rebutted, that the flatness problem,
as formulated by Dicke and Peebles, is not really a problem but rather a misunderstanding.
Nevertheless, the flatness problem is still widely perceived to be real. Most of the arguments
against the idea of a flatness problem are based on the change with time of the density parameter
 and normalized cosmological constant λ and, since the Hubble constant H is not considered,
are independent of time-scale. An independent claim is that fine-tuning is required in order to
produce a Universe which neither collapsed after a short time nor expanded so quickly that
no structure formation could take place. I show that this claim does not imply that fine-tuning
of the basic cosmological parameters is necessary, in part for similar reasons as in the more
restricted flatness problem and in part due to an incorrect application of the idea of perturbing
the early Universe in a gedankenexperiment; I discuss some typical pitfalls of the latter.
Key words: cosmological parameters – cosmology: miscellaneous – cosmology: theory.
1 IN T RO D U C T I O N A N D P R E V I O U S
ARGUMENTS AG AINST THE FLATNESS
PROBLEM
Here, I consider only ideal Friedmann (1922,1924) models, because
historically fine-tuning claims have been discussed within the
context of those models; also, the issues remain even in more-
realistic models. In other words, the universe is considered to
be homogeneous and isotropic and to consist of non-relativistic
matter (‘dust’) and a cosmological constant (which does not vary
in time). That is an acceptable approximation to our Universe at
late times. At early times, radiation (or, more generally, relativistic
matter as well) must be taken into account, but the arguments
presented here are qualitatively the same whether that is included
or neglected. Of course, essentially all problems can be solved by
postulating appropriate initial conditions, but that is rightly seen
as unsatisfying, although at some level some properties of the
Universe might be due to nothing other than initial conditions.
Note, however, that the flatness problem is different from another
problem of classical cosmology, the isotropy or horizon problem.
The latter does not exist, by definition, in an ideal Friedmann
universe, while the point of the former is that even given the fact
that the Universe is described by a Friedmann model (why that
is the case is, of course, a different question), there is something
puzzling about the values of the cosmological parameters which are
observed.
For a homogeneous and isotropic (‘Robertson–Walker’) universe
consisting of non-relativistic matter (‘dust’) of density ρ and the
cosmological constant  (with dimension time−2), the change in
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with the dimensionless constant k equal to −1, 0, and +1 depending
on spatial curvature (negative, vanishing or positive, respectively);
R is the scale factor (with dimension length) of the universe, G is
the gravitational constant, and c is the speed of light. It is useful to


















The Hubble constant H has the dimension time−1; all other quanti-
ties defined above are dimensionless: the normalized cosmological
constant λ, the density parameter , the curvature parameter K, and
the deceleration parameter q. ρcrit is known as the critical density1
1For λ = 0 and k = 0, ρ = ρcrit = (3H 2)/(8πG). This density is ‘critical’
in the sense that, for λ = 0, a greater (lesser) density implies a positive
(negative) curvature and a universe (assumed to be expanding now) which
will collapse in the future (expand forever); similarly, for k = 0, a greater
(lesser) density implies a negative (positive) cosmological constant and a
universe (assumed to be expanding now) which will collapse in the future
(expand forever). However, in the general case (k = 0 and λ = 0), ρcrit does
not have any special meaning, though  remains a useful parameter.
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(see Helbig 2012 or Kayser, Helbig & Schramm 1997 for more
details on this notation).
From the definitions above, it follows that
R = c
H




for k = 0; for k = 0, the radius of curvature is infinite – the scale
factor at the present time is then usually taken to be c/H0.2 Note
that K is positive, if the curvature is positive. Often, k is defined
as −K, so that the Friedman equation is m + λ + k = 1
(m ≡ , λ ≡ λ).3 Denoting the current epoch of observation


























(Note that equation (4) can be inverted to give the scale factor as











+ λ0R2 − K0R20
) . (5)
Alternatively, dividing the Friedmann equation, equation (3), by



















or, due to the definition of H, in












which expresses the Hubble constant as a function of the scale factor.







Since the density depends on the scale factor,
2In general, one can describe the change in time of the scale factor in
relation to a fiducial, usually the current, scale factor; a is often defined as
the relative scale factor R/R0 and is thus dimensionless. Another common
approach, which I use here, is to take the scale factor R to be the radius of
curvature as given by equation (2) for k = 0. In this case, this works for any
time t, not just t0. For k = 0, R0, the scale factor at a fiducial time (usually
taken to be the present), is arbitrary but is often set to c/H0. Note, however,
that in general R = c/H, including the flat case where R0 = c/H0 (R = c/H at
all times in the special case of the relativistic equivalent of the Milne model
with λ = 0 and  = 0 and hence k = −1).
3I have long used K as defined above, as do Goliath & Ellis (1999), though
Wainwright & Ellis (2005) define K with the opposite sign, using it as others


















Note that H and R are related by equation (7). Thus, in an expanding
universe, λ and  can increase with time only if H decreases.4
Although it had been discussed earlier (e.g. Dicke 1970), most
treatments of the flatness problem can be traced back to the
formulation of the problem by Dicke & Peebles (1979), who pointed
out that a universe with  = 1 is inherently unstable.5 Many
concluded from that that  = 1 must hold exactly, which, if one
assumes that  = 0 – which was common in the time after Dicke &
Peebles (1979) until observations made it clear in the 1990s that 
> 0 (at least when observations are interpreted within the context
of Friedmann–Robertson–Walker (FRW)6 models) – implies that
our Universe must be the Einstein–de Sitter universe exactly or
that some process, such as inflation, drove it very close to the
Einstein–de Sitter universe.7 Both the fine-tuning argument (‘there
must be some reason why  = 1 to very high precision in the early
Universe’) and the instability argument (‘even given that  = 1 to
very high precision in the early Universe, if  is not exactly 1, then
it would be unlikely to observe  ≈ 1 today’) have been shown to be
wrong.
The fine-tuning argument is wrong basically because  is not the
appropriate parameter to use (e.g. Cho & Kantowski 1994; Coule
1995; Evrard & Coles 1995; Coles & Ellis 1997; Kirchner & Ellis
2003; Adler & Overduin 2005; Gibbons & Turok 2008; Roukema &
Blanlœil 2010; Helbig 2012; Holman 2018); that is most easily
seen by studying the change in λ and  during the evolution of the
universe as a dynamical system (e.g. Stabell & Refsdal 1966; Ehlers
& Rindler 1989; Goliath & Ellis 1999; Uzan & Lehoucq 2001;
Coley 2003; Wainwright & Ellis 2005), some such studies explicitly
pointing out that that point of view demonstrates the lack of a flatness
problem in classical cosmology (e.g. Kirchner & Ellis 2003; Lake
2005; Helbig 2012; Holman 2018). Note that Collins & Hawking
(1973) claimed that the Anthropic Principle could solve the flatness
problem, long before the popular formulation by Dicke & Peebles
(1979) and before Carter (1974) publicly proposed the Anthropic
4This is an important point. Since all non-empty big-bang models begin
their evolution arbitrarily close to the Einstein–de Sitter model with λ = 0
and  = 1, large values of those parameters can be due only to a low value
of the Hubble constant.
5They assumed that  = 0. If one replaces  with  + λ, then some, but
not all, of their arguments still hold. For example, if  + λ = 1 exactly,
then that holds for all time. On the other hand, the individual values of 
and λ evolve with time (even though their sum is constant) in a flat universe
(except in the cases of the Einstein–de Sitter universe with  = 0 and  =
1 and the de Sitter universe with  = 1 and  = 0); if  < 0 then both
evolve to (−)∞ at the time of maximum expansion (such universes always
collapse in the future).
6One sometimes sees ‘FLRW’ instead of ‘FRW’, in order to include
Lemaı̂tre. While I have great respect for Lemaı̂tre, Friedmann had discussed
the full range of RW models based on GR, so FRW is a sufficient abbreviation
in that context.
7Of course, even if there is no flatness problem in classical cosmology, it
does not follow that inflation could not have happened.
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Principle, though Hawking was aware of Carter’s ideas (Williams
2007).8
Lake (2005) demonstrated that the instability argument does not
hold for universes which expand forever because λ and  are large
and the universe significantly non-flat only in the case that they are
fine-tuned in the sense that α = sign(K)(272λ)/(4K3) ≈ 1. Note
that that is the opposite of the claim that fine-tuning is required in
order to have a flat universe (though, as noted above, that claim is
false). Lake suggested that α (essentially the product of the square
of the mass of a spatially closed universe and the cosmological
constant), which has a fixed value throughout the life of the universe,
is what should be used to characterize model universes. Adler &
Overduin (2005) discussed various definitions of ‘nearly flat’, using
essentially the same parameter as α used by Lake (2005), and arrived
at the same conclusion, namely that a significantly non-flat universe
implies a fine-tuning in α.
Helbig (2012) showed that, while λ and  become arbitrarily
large in a universe which collapses, that is the case only during a
relatively short (and special) time in the lifetime of the universe,
thus a typical observer would not measure very large values.9 (That
holds for all universes which collapse except some with λ > 0, but
in those cases, Lake’s fine-tuning argument applies.) Of course, 
approaches 0 for almost10 all universes which expand forever, but
the fact that  is not observed to be arbitrarily small is no more
puzzling than the fact that we are, in some sense, infinitely close to
the big bang if the Universe will expand forever.
Holman (2018) discussed in detail various questionable argu-
ments and misconceptions regarding the flatness problem as well
as different varieties of it. Although not a review per se, it is an
excellent treatment of the flatness problem and misunderstandings
of it, exploring some of the arguments against it, in particular the
‘reverse-fine-tuning’ argument of Lake (2005) and the fractional-
time-scale argument of Helbig (2012), as well as related issues in
a wider context. Also, Lewis & Barnes (2017), in a book-length
discussion of fine-tuning in physics and cosmology, came to the
conclusion that the flatness problem is mostly harmless. (That is
significant since they otherwise point out several examples of fine-
tuning.)
8Collins & Hawking (1973) is a classic example of application of the
Anthropic Principle. Their paper has been cited often, but usually not in
connection with the flatness problem or the Anthropic Principle. Examples
like that can be used to claim that the Anthropic Principle can explain
everything. Even if true, it does not follow that the Anthropic Principle
does explain everything. On the other hand, if, as in the case of the flatness
problem, another, and presumably better, explanation is found, it does not
follow that everything explained by the Anthropic Principle must have
another, and presumably better, explanation (see Barrow & Tipler 1988
for (much) more on the Anthropic Principle).
9Depending on how large one deems that α must be in order not to be
fine-tuned, this argument is probably somewhat weaker than that of Lake
(2005) in that it cannot explain why K = 1 to within at least 1 per cent or so,
as is indicated by observations, but it still shows that the original flatness-
problem argument (which was essentially the question why  is not 105,
say) is incorrect.
10The exceptions are the extremely fine-tuned cases of a universe which
asymptotically approaches the static Einstein universe (in that case the value
of R has an upper limit which is reached after an infinite time) and the
Einstein–de Sitter model, which always has  = 1; the latter expands forever
and has no upper limit on R, but Ṙ, H, and ρ all approach 0. (Although,
as discussed above, models near the Einstein–de Sitter model are not fine-
tuned, the Einstein–de Sitter model itself is infinitely fine-tuned.)
Even though the arguments mentioned above have been around
for years or even decades, the argument of Dicke & Peebles (1979) is
still found in its original form in modern textbooks (e.g. Ryden 2017;
Longair & Smeenk 2019; Wright 2020)11 and review articles (e.g.
O’Raifeartaigh et al. 2018; Adams 2019). Even many observational
astronomers are familiar with the flatness problem and see inflation
as an attractive solution (e.g. Schmidt 1989; Sandage 1995).
2 TI ME-SCALE A RGUMENTS
The first suggestion that the flatness problem could be avoided via a
time-scale argument seems to be due to Tangherlini (1993), though
not in the context of an FRW universe. Using a similar argument,
as noted above, Helbig (2012) pointed out that, in a universe which
will collapse, a typical observer would not observe large values of
 and λ. The important point is the relative amount of time during
which  and λ are 1.
However, it is sometimes claimed, following Dicke (1970), ‘that
any deviations from flat geometry in the early universe would
quickly escalate into a runaway open or closed universe, neither
of which is observed’ (O’Raifeartaigh et al. 2018, footnote 40, is a
typical example). So even though it has been demonstrated that there
is no flatness problem, i.e. a typical observer should not be puzzled
by the fact that large values of  and λ are not observed – because
the corresponding cosmological models are unlikely (Lake 2005)
or because such values occur only during a short and special time in
the history of the universe (Helbig 2012) – nor is some sort of fine-
tuning necessary to explain the fact that  = 1 to high precision in
the early universe, nevertheless it is often claimed that Dicke had a
valid point: even if there is no flatness problem in those senses, some
sort of fine-tuning is necessary, because otherwise a short time after
the big bang the universe would have collapsed or  would have
evolved to a value 	1. Just as the argument of the relative time-scale
shows why the tight-rope analogy (e.g. Coles 2009) is misleading,
the quick-escalation claim is also wrong for essentially the same
reason, namely the use of an inappropriate gedankenexperiment.
That claim is somewhat different from those in the papers cited
farther above, because those involve only relative times. To repeat,
the rebuttals above claim that there is no flatness problem (in the
instability-problem sense) based on relative times (i.e., the universe
can be substantially non-flat, but only for a relatively short time)
or no times at all (i.e., Lake’s argument that a substantially non-
flat universe requires fine-tuning), or rebut the fine-tuning argument
(since all FRW models start arbitrarily close to the Einstein–de Sitter
model, no fine-tuning is needed to explain why  = 1 to high
precision in the early universe). In contrast, claims referring to the
age of the universe must involve the Hubble constant, whereas the
papers cited farther above discuss only λ and .
The argument is usually something like this:
Imagine, shortly after the big bang, slightly increasing the density
of the Universe; that would cause it to collapse after a very short
time, perhaps only a few seconds or less.
Another version replaces ‘density’ by ‘density parameter’, i.e. .
Increasing the density while keeping the Hubble constant H fixed
would also increase , and vica versa. However, one could also
increase  by keeping the density constant and decreasing H. That
should already hint at the resolution: equation (1), the Friedmann
11Note, however, that Smeenk (2019), in a different chapter of the same
book, takes a more balanced view.
MNRAS 00, 1 (2020)
4 P. Helbig
equation, is called the Friedmann equation because it is an equation;
it makes no sense to imagine changing just one parameter. One
would have to change at least two in order for the equation
to remain valid. However, in general, such changes as in the
gedankenexperiment above describe universes very different from
our own, such as a closed universe with a mass of one kilogram.
Yes, such a universe might collapse after a very short time, but
that is irrelevant since it is not our Universe nor even a slight
perturbation of it in any meaningful sense. In other words, if the
Universe is somehow perturbed early on, and one wants to calculate
all possible observational quantities today, one must specify as well
which quantities – α, H, , λ, ρ, , K, the age of the Universe
at the time of the perturbation, the mass of the Universe (for k =
+1) – one regards as fixed and adjust at least one other such that the
Friedmann equation is still valid; changing just one is not possible.
Since the usual objection is at best not well defined and at worse
misleading or even wrong, one could leave it at that, but let us
consider it more quantitatively.
Note that the age of the universe, equation (4), implicitly depends
on H0, via R0; rewritten as equation (5), taking the definition of H0
into account, that dependency is even more explicit. Thus, any
discussion of the age of the universe as a function of the cosmo-
logical parameters must include the Hubble constant, explicitly or
implicitly. Consider a finite universe with positive curvature12 so
that the mass of the universe is given by
M = ρV (11)
= ρ × 2π2R3. (12)



















(√| + λ − 1|)3 . (15)
The mass of the universe is constant in time and is proportional
to /(H
√|K|3). Since the arguments of Lake (2005) and Helbig
(2012) make it unlikely that an observer would measure values of
 or K which are not of order 1, it is clear that a large (in terms of
mass) universe implies a low Hubble constant, at least for a typical
observer (i.e. one living at a likely time in a likely universe). On
the other hand, the age of the universe is also inversely proportional
to H. Thus, all else being equal, a universe which collapses after a
second would have a mass about that of a globular cluster, clearly
very different from our Universe. That a small perturbation (of
course, properly carried out, not just changing one parameter as in
the typical gedankenexperiment) in the early Universe can result
in a universe so different than ours is merely another aspect of the
fine-tuning problem, or rather the lack thereof: all FRW models
are arbitrarily close to the Einstein–de Sitter universe early on. Of
12In this paper, I assume trivial topology. Also, for definiteness, I concentrate
on the k = +1 case, though similar arguments are also possible for other
values of k. Note that Di Valentino, Melchiorri & Silk (2020a,b) claim that
the CMB as measured by Planck favours a closed Universe, though the
situation is not completely clear since a closed Universe reduces the tension
among some sets of observations but increases it among others, possibly
indicating that assuming a flat Universe hides some discrepancies.
course, one could have a highly non-flat universe today with the
same age as that of our Universe, simply by adjusting H0 to give the
required age, though that would imply, in the k = +1 case, a much
less massive universe; also due to the arguments of Helbig (2012)
and Lake (2005), the corresponding values of the cosmological
parameters would occur only for a relatively short time during the
lifetime of the universe or α would have to be fine-tuned to be ≈1.13
So, at best, one could argue that a highly non-flat universe must be
fine-tuned in order to be as old as our Universe, but that would also
differ in terms of mass. As noted above, it is impossible to have a
universe which differs from ours in only one respect. However, that
is not the usual claim; the usual claim is that our Universe, which
is nearly flat, must be fine-tuned in order to be as old as it is. That
is not the case; our Universe is old essentially because it is massive.
Lake (2005) argued that α, essentially the product of the square of
the mass of the universe and , should be thought of as the free
parameter when ‘choosing a universe’. (Since α = 0 for λ = 0 or
 = 0, one can use the corresponding non-zero factor as the free
parameter in those cases, i.e.  or M.) It should be clear that a small
perturbation to our Universe, caused by changing some parameters
in the Friedmann equation at a time shortly after the big bang, should
be small in terms of that parameter, which obviously does not lead to
a vastly different age of the Universe. Note also that since the mass
and the cosmological constant  are constant during the evolution
of the universe, the time of the perturbation does not matter.
3 SU M M A RY A N D C O N C L U S I O N S
Since its original formulation by Dicke (1970) and the populariza-
tion by Dicke & Peebles (1979), especially after the idea of inflation
became popular (e.g. Guth 1981; Linde 1982), many arguments
were made, though largely ignored, which demonstrated that neither
is fine-tuning in the early Universe necessary to explain the values
of λ0 and 0 observed today, whatever they might be, nor is it
puzzling that we do not observe values 1 or 	1 for them. (As
stressed by Holman 2018, those are two sides of the same coin.)
Also, the argument that the early Universe must have been fine-
tuned in order for it to last as long as it has is wrong since it is
based on the impossible idea of modifying just one parameter in the
early Universe. Even if the early Universe is ‘correctly perturbed’
in the sense of retaining the validity of the Friedmann equation, that
argument is wrong since it is essentially a variation of the bogus
instability argument. In addition, a universe with a significantly
shorter time-scale than our Universe would be significantly different
in other ways, and thus ruled out by weak-anthropic arguments
(i.e. those using the weak form of the Anthropic Principle).
The arguments discussed above have been made mostly in the
leading journals in the field, often by people well known and
respected for other contributions, yet the argument of Dicke &
Peebles (1979) is still often stated as an unquestionable fact. Perhaps
the real flatness problem is the question as to why that is the case.
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